Intervention Analysis with Cointegrated Time Series: The Case of the Hawaii Hotel Room Tax by Carl Bonham & Byron Gangnes
1 Between 1984 and 1990,the nationalaveragehotelroom tax rate rose from 7% to nearly 10%,accordingto similar surveysof major US
cities (Mak, 1988;Hiemstraand Ismail,1990).New York citycurrentlyhas the highesthotel room tax at19.25%plus $2.00 on everyroom
priced at $100 or more. (Mak and Sakai, 1993).
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Tourism taxes have become an important source of revenue for many tourist destina-
tions in the USA. Among the most widely used is the hotel room tax, levied by 47
states and many localities. Room taxes are touted by proponents as a way to shift the
local tax burden to non-residents, while the travel industry claims the levies signi® -
cantly harm their competitiveness. Previous studies of room tax impacts have relied
on ex ante estimates of demand and supply elasticities. In this study, we analyse the
e￿ ect on hotel revenues of the Hawaiiroom tax using time series intervention analysis.
We specify a time series model of revenue behaviour that captures the long-run
cointegrating relationships among revenues and important income and relative price
variables, as well as other short-run dynamic in¯ uences. We estimate the e￿ ect on
Hawaii hotel room revenues of the 5% Hawaii hotel room tax introduced in January
1987. We ® nd no evidence of statistically signi® cant tax impacts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tourism taxes have become an important source of revenue
for Hawaii and most other tourist destinations. Among
the most lucrative is the hotel room tax. Hawaii’s room
tax generated $82 million of revenue in 1990, making it
the third largest source of state revenue after the excise
tax and the state income tax (Hawaii Department of
Business, Economic Development and Tourism, State of
Hawaii Data Book, 1991). The prevalence of hotel room
taxes and the rates levied have escalated in recent years,
with growing state ® scal responsibilities and increasing
reluctance to raise tax burdens on local residents; they
are now used by at least 47 of the 50 states and some
localities (Mak and Sakai, 1993).
1 In Hawaii, a 5% hotel
room tax (transient accommodations tax) was imposed
in January 1987, and was increased by one percentage
point in July 1994 to ® nance a new Honolulu convention
centre.
The popular appeal of hotel room taxes is straightfor-
ward: they appear to be an e￿ ective way to shift a portion of
the local tax burden from residents to visitors, without
imposing a substantial negative burden on the localtourism
industry. In addition to expediency, tax shifting to tourists is
justi® ed as an equitable means of assessing visitors for their
demands on local infrastructure and public services. The
casual observations of economists have tended to support
this view. Typical is the statement of Combs and Elledge
(1979, p. 203), made without empirical evidence, that the
`demand for lodging in a resort [is] inelastic with respect to
price.’ so that `a small ad valorem tax imposed on motel
rooms and other forms of temporary lodging would have
very little impact on the industry and would generate sub-
stantial revenue for the local government.’ Not surprisingly,
hotel operators are less sanguine, claiming that the levies
reduce after-tax pro® ts and drive away tourists to compet-
ing travel destinations. (See for example The Honolulu
Advertiser, 1993.)
0003Ð 6846 Ó 1996 Routledge 12812 SeeBox,Jenkinsand Reinsel(1994),Chapter12,fora descriptionofthemethodology.An importantearly applicationwas a studyby Box
and Tiao (1975) of the e￿ect of air pollution control laws. Recent applications include McPheters, Mann, and Schlagenhauf(1984), who
analysetheimpactof harshergunlaws on propertycrimerates,andFombyandHayes(1990),who examinethee￿ ectof thewar on poverty
on poor families.
3 See Philips (1983, p. 71), and, in an international trade setting, Armington (1969). The assumption is made here for expositional
simplicity.
Nearly all existing empirical studies of tourism taxes have
attempted to gauge the likely impact of prospective taxes
using econometric estimates of supply and demand elastici-
ties. These ex ante estimates have produced con¯ icting evid-
ence on the impact of hotel taxes on the lodging industry.
(See for example Fujii, Khaled and Mak, 1985, 1988;
Zuraski and Sanders, 1990; Hiemstra and Ismail, 1990.) In
this study, we evaluate ex post the e￿ ect of the 1987 Hawaii
hotel room tax imposition using time series intervention
analysis.
2 We extend the work of Bonham et al. (1992) who
consider a univariate model and ® nd a small, though statist-
ically insigni® cant, decline in room revenues. By generaliz-
ing their approach to a multivariate context, we are able to
incorporate the in¯ uence of other factors that may have
a￿ected the hotel revenues during this time period, such as
the emergence of the Japanese real estate bubble, the ap-
preciation of the yen, and slowing growth on the US main-
land, potentially permitting the e￿ ect of the tax change itself
to be better isolated. In addition, we treat long-run and
seasonal non-stationarity issues that were not addressed
adequately in earlier work.
We estimate a multivariate transfer function model with
noise that explains the pre-1987 time path of Hawaii hotel
revenues, and we look for evidence that the room tax led to
a decline in revenues below the path predicted by our model.
We allow for the possibility of cointegrating relationships
among room revenues and key macroeconomic variables,
an extension of traditional intervention analysis that to our
knowledge has not previously appeared in the literature.
The resulting model of Hawaii hotel room revenues relates
growth in hotel room revenues to growth in Californianand
Japanese economic activity, US and Japanese wealth, and
movements in US interest rates, and it incorporates error-
correction terms that capture long-run cointegrating rela-
tionships among room revenues, Californian and Japanese
activity,and the real yen/dollar exchange rate. We test for an
independent e￿ect on revenues of the 1987 hotel room tax
and ® nd no evidence of statistically signi® cant tax impacts.
II. MODELLING HOTEL ROOM REVENUES
We describe the market for hotel room rentals using
a simple partial equilibrium demand and supply model. By
identifying factors that in¯ uence the demand for and supply
of lodging services, we determine variables that should be
important in an empirical model of room revenues. Data for
some factors that appear in the theoretical speci® cation are
not availableat the monthly frequency used in the empirical
model; in such cases, appropriate proxy variables for these
e￿ ects are used, or the e￿ ect is omitted.
At a minimum, demand for room rentals should depend
positively on consumer income and negatively on room
rental rates. There are likely also important cross-price
e￿ ects, re¯ ecting (a) consumer substitution between
Hawaiian vacations and vacations in other travel destina-
tions, and (b) substitution (or complementarity) between
consumption of lodging and non-lodging items in Hawaii
(for example, food, tours, etc.). If utility is weakly separable,
we can represent this problem as a two-stage budgeting
process.
3 In the ® rst stage, consumers choose an optimal
consumption of `Hawaiian vacations’, DH, based on their
income, Y , overall prices of Hawaiian vacations, PH, prices
of vacations in other tourism markets, PO and prices of
non-tourism consumption, P:
DH = F(PH, PO, P, Y ) (1)










Givenan overall consumption level for Hawaiianvacations,
D
H, tourists will allocate that demand across hotel room
services and non-room expenditures (meals, entertainment,




In the ® rst stage, the price of Hawaiian vacations includes
prices of room and non-room expenditures, as well as trans-
portation costs to and from the islands. In addition to
current income, there may also be a role for `permanent
income’ or wealth (A) as an additional shift parameter. In
particular, the Japanese asset `bubble’ may have played
a role in the surge in Japanese travel to the islands in the late
1980s. Acknowledging this possibility, and distinguishing
between factors a￿ecting westbound visitors (primarily US
mainland tourists, with smaller numbers from Canada, and
Europe, etc.), and eastbound visitors (primarily from Japan),
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, PL, PK, PZ, M, t 2 (6)
4 Visitors from Japan represented 26% of total visitors to Hawaii in 1992. The percentageof visitors from California was 21 (See Hawaii
Visitors Bureau, 1993.)
5 Appraisal-basedland valuedata are availableat the end of the ® scal year (31 March) and the half ® scal year (30 September),only. Stone
and Ziemba (1993) review evidence that Japanese stock and land prices are more closely related than for other countries, although they
may not be cointegrated.
where EY = /$ and EY = /O are exchange rates of the yen with
respect to the dollar and currencies relevant for other Ja-
panese travel destinations.
On the supply side, we assume that price is a markup over
marginal costs:
PR
S = markup´MCR = M´H(PL, PK, PZ, SR) (5)
where PL, PK and PZ are the input prices of labour, capital,
and other inputs, S
R is the quantity supplied, and P
R
S is the
supply price of rooms, which will di￿ er from the consumer
price, PR, by PR = (1 + t )´PR
S in the presence of an ad
valorem room tax, t .
We combine the equations for demand and supply to
obtain a single reduced-form equilibrium solution for price
(PR
S) and quantity (QR). We are interested in their product,
total room revenue net of taxes, BR
S:
Given speci® c functional forms for supply and demand
equations, one could estimate a structural supplyÐ demand
model, solve explicitly for revenues, and conduct compara-
tive static exercises to evaluate the impact of a change in
hotel room taxes, t . (For a general comparative static
analysis see Fujii, Im and Sakai, 1993.) In this paper, we
model hotel room revenues directly. One advantage of
this approach is that it allows us to work with a rela-
tively precise measure of our dependent variable. Tax base
data allow us to study the revenues of nearly the entire
population of hotels, condominiums, bed and breakfast
inns, and other short-term accommodations, rather than
survey samples of hotel price and quantity. Equation 6
is used to suggest variables relevant for our reduced-form
empirical model, without concern for the precise functional
form.
Data for many of the variables in Equation 6 can be
obtained, or an appropriate proxy variable can be found.
Unfortunately, data for most of the key relative prices are
not available at the monthly frequency needed for our
analysis. In particular, monthly data series are no longer
available for Hawaiian consumer prices or their compo-
nents, preventing us from computing CPI-based proxies for
the relative price of room to non-room expenditures or of
Hawaiian vacations relative to other destinations. We are
unaware of other readily available high-frequency travel-
industry data on vacation prices that might be used instead.
One set of relative price measures that is available is
exchange rates. Changes in the value of the yen relative to
the dollar substantially altered the price competitiveness of
Hawaiian vacations for Japanese travellers during this time
period. A strengthening yen after 1985 may have been an
important factor in the strong growth of Japanese tourism
in the islands. Yen/dollar exchange rates are an important
explanatory variable in the empirical model.
Real disposable income series are available both for the
USA and Japan. Since a disproportionately large number of
westbound visitors come from the West Coast, we also
consider Californian employment as a measure of regional
income growth.
4 Broad measures of wealth can be com-
puted from ¯ ow-of-funds data, but not for the monthly
frequency of this analysis.Similarly, it would be nice to have
a good Japanese land price measure to capture the e￿ ects of
land appreciation during the `bubble’. These data are also
unavailable at monthly frequencies.
5 Instead, as a proxy for
wealth e￿ ects we use stock price indexes for the two coun-
tries. Overall consumer price indexes for the USA and
Japan are used to de¯ ate nominal stock prices.
Labour and capital costs that may a￿ect hotel room
supply are captured by a hotel industry wage rate and time
series of long-term US and Japanese interest rates. We have
not been able to acquire high-frequency data for local land
prices, a third important input price. Note that exchange
rates and asset price variables may also in¯ uence the cost of
capital ¯ owing from Japan to Hawaii.
III. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF HAWAII
HOTEL ROOM REVENUES
We model room revenues using a multiple-input transfer
function-noise model, augmented to include long-run coin-
tegrating relationships among a subset of variables. In this
section we describe the data, the results of stationarity tests,
and adjustment for non-stationarity at seasonal frequencies.
We then discuss estimation of cointegrating relationships
among key variables,outline the speci® cation of the transfer
function model and discuss characteristics of the selected
revenue model.
Hawaii hotel room tax 12836 The existence of stochastic trend and seasonal components in time series has received considerable attention in the econometrics
literatureover the past decade.See Campbelland Perron (1991) for a recent surveyof issues related to long-run(non-seasonal)unit roots
and cointegration. For seasonality, see Hylleberg (1992).
7 Their test extends, to the case of monthly data, the test for quarterlytime series developedin Hylleberg,Engle, Granger and Yoo (1990)
(hereafterHEGY). HEGY de® ne an integratedseries as one that has an in® nite value in its spectrum at a given frequencyv . For monthly
data,the frequenciesof interestcorrespondto v = i/12, i = 0, ¼ , 11,of a (2P ) cycle.A series(1 - B) xt = et thatis integratedof order1 at
frequency v = 0, is denoted I0(1) . More generally, a series integrated of order d at frequency v is denoted Iv (d) .
8 Ghysels,Lee and Noh (1994)providea detaileddiscussionof practicalissues relevantto testingfor unit rootsin seasonalprocessesusing
the HEGY test, a test dueto Dickey,Haszaand Fuller(1984),and the standardDickeyÐ Fullertest. Hylleberg(1993)comparesthe HEGY
test with a test developed by Canova and Hansen (1993).
9 B is the back-shift operator, Bnxt = xt± n.
1 0 See Beaulieu and Miron (1993) for de® nitions of yk, and a more complete description of the testing procedure.
1 1 Following Campbelland Perron (1991),we begin with a generalspeci® cation,with p set at a large value,p = pmax = 24. We then reduce
the lag length until a statistically signi® cant coe￿ cient, u W j, is found at the 5% level.
1 2 Seasonalityof macroeconomictime series is often dealtwith by usingseasonaladjustment® lters such asthe Census X-11procedure.We
have purposely avoided the use of such symmetric® lters here becausetheir use of leads as well as lags may cause misidenti® cationof the
tax intervention. However, seasonal unit roots must be removed from the data to ensure consistent estimation of zero frequency
cointegrating vectors. (See Engle, Granger and Hallman, 1989; HEGY, 1990.)
Data characteristics and seasonal Þ ltering
Our data set consists of ten monthly time series Ð real hotel
room revenues (HR), real disposable income in Japan and
the US (JPY and USY ), Californian non-farm employment
(CAEMP), real Japanese and US stock prices (JPW and
USW ), the real yen/dollar exchange rate (EXCH), real gov-
ernment bond rates in Japan and the US (JPR and USR),
and wages in the Hawaiian hotel industry (HWAGE). (See
the Appendix for details.) Because the hotel revenue series is
not available prior to 1978, our sample size is limited to
monthly data beginning in 1978:5 and extending to 1990:1.
(Lagged data extending back prior to 1978:5 are used for
input series.) Natural logarithms of each time series are
used.
Casual examination of the data reveals two properties
common to many macroeconomic time series: (1) distinct
trends, and (2) pronounced seasonality. The seasonal and
trend behaviour may be deterministic or stochastic, with the
stochastics generated by either stationary or non-stationary
processes. Because standard procedures for estimation and
inference require stationary regressors, we have evaluated
the stochastic properties of each of our data series.
6
We test for non-stationarity using a method developed in
Beaulieu and Miron (1993).
7 This procedure is a straightfor-
ward extension of the well known DickeyÐ Fuller test for
zero frequency unit roots and allows us to test the null
hypothesis of a unit root at the zero and/or seasonal fre-
quencies based on a single OLS regression.
8 We estimate
the following regression,












u jy1 3 , t± j
+ m0DTt + m1 + e t (7)
where y1 3 , t = (1 - B
1 2) xt is the xt series ® ltered to remove
all possible unit roots, and each of the yk, t± 1, k = 1, ¼ , 12,
are ® ltered to remove all but one of the 12 possible seasonal
and long-run unit roots.
9 For instance, y1 , t± 1 = S(B) xt± 1 is
® ltered to remove all seasonal roots but not the zero fre-
quency root, while y2 , t± 1 is xt± 1 ® ltered to remove the zero
frequency and all seasonal unit roots except for the root at
frequency v = 1/2 of a (2p ) cycle. Finding a unit root in xt at
v = 0 implies accepting the null hypothesis that g 1 is zero,
that is that the series is integrated at the long-run frequency.
When g 2 is zero, we cannot reject the null of a unit root at
the frequency v = 1/2, a bimonthly cycle. The remaining
seasonal roots are complex conjugates; ® nding a pair of
complex unit roots requires that both coe￿ cients g k and
g k± 1 equal zero for k = 4, 6, 8, 10, 12. Tests are based on
t-statistics for g 1, and g 2, and F-statistics for joint tests of
the complex pairs.
1 0
In Equation 7, Sk, t for k = 2, ¼ , 12 are seasonal dum-
mies included to capture possible deterministic seasonality.
A constant term, m1, and a deterministic trend, DTt, are also
included. Lags of the dependent variable Y 1 3 , t± j are added
to whiten the residuals e t, with the number of lags, p, deter-
mined empirically.
1 1 The power of our unit root tests is
reduced if we augment Equation 7 with too many auxiliary
parameters, u j, to reduce the residuals to white noise or, mk,
to model all possible deterministic components. However, if
we exclude auxiliary parameters that belong in the data
generating process, the size of the tests may be much greater
than the chosen signi® cance level, and the test will have low
power against certain alternative data generating processes
(DGP). (See Ghysels, Lee and Noh, 1994.)
Results of unit root tests are presented in Table 1. All
series are found to be I0(1) , and many of them are found to
have seasonal unit roots as well. The most common sea-
sonal unit root is at frequency v = 1/3, a quarterly cycle.
Where seasonal unit roots are detected, this information is
used to ® lter out the stochastic non-stationary seasonal
component of the series so that we can obtain consistent
estimates of any long-run cointegrating relationships that
may exist.
1 2 The ® lters applied to remove the detected sea-
sonal unit roots are indicated in the last column of Table 1.






unit root unit root(s)
Hotel room revenues HR Yes 1/3 1 + B + B
2
Real Y = /$ exchange rate EXCH Yes None None
US real disposable income USY Yes 1/2 1 + B
Japanese real disposable income JPY Yes 1/2, 1/3 1 + 2B + 2B
2 + B
3
Californian employment CAEMP Yes 1/3 1 + B + B
2
US real wealth USW Yes None None
Japanese real wealth JPW Yes 1/3 1 + B + B
2
US real interest rate USR Yes None None
Japanese real interest rate JPR Yes 1/3 1 + B + B
2
Hawaii real hotel wage HWAGE Yes 1/4 1 + B
2
Notes:Exceptfor interestrates,naturallogarithmsof all series are used. All underlyingdataseries are non-seasonallyadjusted,
except for US disposable income. The seasonal ® lters are expressed as polynomials in the backshift (lag) operator, B, where
Bi
Xt = Xt ± i. Details available from the authors upon request.
1 3 It is also possible that a subset of time series is cointegratedat seasonalfrequencies.(See Engle, Granger,Hylleberg and Lee, 1993.) Of
the four time series consideredhere, real hotel room revenues,real Japanesedisposableincome, and Californian employmenthave a unit
root at the same seasonal frequency, v = 1/3. (Real Japanese disposable income also has unit root at v = 1/2.) Tests for seasonal
cointegration in the VAR framework used here are possible, but would involve estimating additional coe￿ cients (those on the series
® ltered to remove all but the root at v = 1/3), leaving even fewer degrees of freedom. Also, there are no published critical values for
seasonalcointegrationtestswith monthlydata.Wehavechosentoleavethe issueof seasonalcointegrationforfutureworkthatcan exploit
the full sample of data.
1 4 See for example Hamilton (1994), Chapter 19.
1 5 The number of cointegrating vectors is determined by the rank of P , r(P ) . If no stationary linear combinations of the four variables
exist, r(P ) is zero. Generally,if 0< r(P ) < 4, there will be some (43 r) matricesa and b , such that P = a b 9 , and b 9 xt± 1 is stationary.The
rows of b 9 are cointegratingvectors describinglong-run equilibriumrelationships.(The 43 r matrixa gives vector error-correctionterms
that determine the rate at which the system approaches its long-run equilibrium.)
Identifying long-run determinants of hotel room revenues
Since we ® nd zero frequency unit roots in each of the time
series, we would like to test for cointegration among the
complete set of data series. Given our small sample and the
potentially large number of lags that would be needed to
whiten residuals in a vector error-correction model with
monthly data, we choose to test for cointegration among
only a subset of variables. Speci® cally, we focus on the
series which we believe a priori to have the closest relation-
ship to hotel room revenues in Hawaii: real Japanese
disposable income, Californian income (proxied by employ-
ment), and the real yen/dollar exchange rate (all series in
logarithms).
1 3
To test for cointegration among these four variables,
we use a procedure developed in Johansen (1988) and
applied in Johansen and Juselius (1990). The data gener-
ating process for the four-element vector process
xt = [HR, CAEMP, JPY , EXCH]9 can be written as an un-
restricted vector autoregression in levels:
xt = p 1xt± 1 + p 2xt± 2 + ¼ + p kxt± k + e t ,
e t ~ NID(0, S ) (8)
where p i are (43 4) matrices of parameters for all lags
i = 1, ¼ , k = p - 1. This system can be reparameterized as
the vector error-correction model
1 4
D xt = G 1D xt± 1 + G 2D xt± 2 + ¼ + G k± 1D xt± k+ 1
+ P xt± 1 + e t (9)
where G i = - [p i+ 1 + p i+ 2 + ¼ + p k], i = 1, ¼ , k - 1,
and P = - [In - p 1 - p 2 - ¼ - p k]. The only di￿ erence
between Equation 9 and a standard VAR in di￿ erences is
the error-correction term, P xt± k. It is this term which con-
tains information about the long-run cointegrating relation-
ships among the four variables in xt. Since xt is a vector of
I0(1) variables, D xt is I0(0) . Therefore, the dependent vari-
able in Equation 9 and the ® rst k - 1 regressors are all
stationary processes. If the ® nal term, P xt± 1, is to be sta-
tionary, then P must either be the null matrix or it must
contain up to three cointegrating vectors which form sta-
tionary linear combinations of the variables in xt.
1 5
Johansen and Juselius (1990) develop two types of eigen-
value tests for determining the number of cointegrating
vectors. The trace test is a test of the hypothesis that there
are at most r cointegrating vectors against the alternative of
Hawaii hotel room tax 1285Table 2. Cointegration tests
D xt = G 1D xt ± 1 + G 2D xt± 2 + ¼ + G k ± 1D xt± k+ 1 + P xt ± 1 + e t
Trace test Maximum eigenvalue test
r = 0 r < 1 r < 2 r = 0 r = 1 r = 2
68.67* 29.62* 10.40 39.05* 19.22 9.99
Note: r is the number of cointegratingvectors, i.e. the rank of the
matrix P in Equation 9.
* Indicates statistical signi® cance at the 5% level. Critical values
for the cointegrationtests are takenfrom Osterwald-Lenum(1992,
Table A1).
1 6 An alternative approach would be to follow a general-to-speci® c, two-step error-correction modelling procedure and specify an
autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model (or autoregressive/moving average model with exogenous variables Ð ARMAX) with
error-correctionterms. See Harvey(1990),Chapters 7 and 8. We chose the transfer function approachbecauseof the natural extensionto
modelling the intervention e￿ect of a tax change.
no cointegration. The maximum eigenvalue test is used to
test the null of r cointegrating vectors againstthe alternative
of r - 1 cointegrating vectors. Following these procedures,
we test for cointegration among the four series of real hotel
room revenues, Japanese real disposable income, Califor-
nian employment, and the real yen/dollar exchange rate.
Results are given in Table 2. Using the trace test, we reject
the null of no cointegrating vectors, as well asthe null of one
or fewer cointegrating vectors. Finally we cannot reject at
the 5% level the null of two cointegrating vectors. Results
from the maximum eigenvalue test indicate one fewer coin-
tegrating vector. While we reject the null of zero cointegrat-
ing vectors in favour of the alternative r = 1, we cannot reject
the null that r = 1 in favour of r = 2. Therefore the max-
imum eigenvalue test suggests that only one cointegrating
vector exists, while the tracetest indicates that there are two.
The cointegrating vectors (eigenvectors) associated with
the two largest eigenvalues,normalized on the hotel revenue
series, are:
HRt = 1.437´CAEMPt + 1.142´JPY t
- 0.882´EXCHt + z1 , t (10)
HRt = - 1.313´CAEMPt + 2.474´JPY t
- 0.615´EXCHt + z2 , t (11)
The cointegrating relationships imply substantial e￿ ects on
hotel room revenues of both income and real exchange
rates. In the ® rst vector, for example, a 1% increase in
Californianemployment increases hotel room revenues over
1.4%, if other factors are unchanged, while a 1% appreci-
ation of the dollar leads to a 0.9% decline in room revenues.
(All coe￿ cients are signi® cantly di￿ erent from zero at the
5% level.)
If actual hotel revenues deviate from the long-run equilib-
rium level implied by Equation 10 or 11, the equilibrium
errors z1 , t and z2 , t will be non-zero, and HRt will adjust
toward the long-run equilibrium. The errors z1 , t and z2 , t are
introduced as inputs in the general transfer function/noise
model of room revenues developed below. The speed of
adjustment of room revenues to the long-run path is then
estimated within the full dynamic model.
A multiple-input transfer function/noise model of hotel room
revenues
In this section we develop a dynamic model of hotel room
revenues using the transfer function approach developed by
Box and Jenkins (Box, Jenkins and Reinsel, 1994). We
extend the BoxÐ Jenkins methodology to incorporate long-
run cointegrating relationships, an extension that apparent-
ly has not previously appeared in the literature.
Following the approach of Box and Jenkins, we assume
the real revenue series (in logarithms) is generated by a mul-







+ h t (12)
where vj(B) = vj0 + vj1B + vj2B
2 + ¼ + vjkjBkj, j = 1, ¼, m,
are transfer functions that relate exogenous input variables
xj, t to the output series HRt and bj is a pure delay parameter
indicating the number of periods before a change in xj, t be-
gins to a￿ect HRt. The dynamicprocesses described by these
transfer functions can be more parsimoniously represented
by ratios of moving averageand autoregressive polynomials
in the backshift operator, wj(B) and d j(B),
vj(B) =
wj0 + wj1B + wj2B
2 + ¼ + wjsBs
1 - d j1B - d j2B




for j = 1, ¼ , m (13)
The unexplained noise processh t can similarly be modelled
as h t =
u (B)
/ (B)
at, where at is a white noise process. The














The attraction of the transfer function approach is that it
provides a parsimonious representation of the real revenue
series in terms of its own past and a small set of plausible
leading indicator inputs.
1 6
Standard practice involves di￿ erencing the output and
input series to ensure stationarity. While we follow this
1286 C. S. Bonham and B. Gangnes1 7 Noticethat Equation15 is essentiallythe ® rst row of the VECM, Equation9, augmentedwith distributedlags on additionalexogenous
explanatory variables.
1 8 This method di￿ ers from Box and Jenkins who recommend pre-whiteningthe time series before estimatingcross-correlationfunctions
used in obtaining estimates of vW j.
1 9 We useLjungÐ Box(1978)Q-statisticstotestfor serialcorrelation,andHannan(1963)e￿ cientestimation(a frequencydomainversionof
generalized least squares) to correct for serial correlation when estimating the impulse response weights.
2 0 The identi® ed model (Equation 15) is estimated by non-linear least squares, using the RATS v. 4.02 Boxjenk command.
2 1 The in-sample forecasts are static forecasts: actual values minus the residuals from Equation 15 estimated over the pre-intervention
sample period 1978:9 to 1986:12.The out-of-sampleforecasts for 1987:1 to 1990:1 are dynamic forecasts; predicted revenue growth rates
are fed forward as lagged inputsto successiveperiods’ revenuegrowth forecasts (In Fig. 1, the dashedlines shows forecastvalues,the solid
line, actual data.).
practice for most variables, we also incorporate the long-run
cointegrating relationships identi® ed earlier. This gives the
model,












The equilibrium errors z1 , t± 1 and z2 , t± 1 are as de® ned in
Equations 10 and 11. The error-correction coe￿ cients
a 1 and a 2 are expected to have negative signs, so that
deviations from the cointegrating relationship are elimi-
nated over time.
1 7 This speci® cation permits us to impose
the long-run cointegrating relationships among hotel room
revenues, economic activity, and exchange rate variables,
while also capturing, through standard transfer function
terms, the short-run in¯ uence on room revenues of all the
input variables.
The BoxÐ Jenkins approach to transfer function model-
ling isvery similarto their approachto modelling univariate
time series and involves a particular strategy of identi® ca-
tion, estimation, and diagnostic testing. The identi® cation
stage may be thought of as a three-step process. First we ob-
tain rough estimates of a ® nite number of impulse response
weights, vj0, vj1, ¼ , vjk
j
, for j = 1, ¼ , m from the autoreg-
ressive distributed lag representation in Equation 12. These
are used to get some idea about the shape of the model’s
dynamic structure. Second, on the basis of the estimated lag
structure, we choose orders for the moving average and
autoregressive polynomials, r and s, so that the rational
polynomials in Equation 13 provide an adequate approxi-
mation to the transfer functions vj (B). Finally, we identify
a suitable ARMA(p, q) process for the disturbance term h t.
Estimation of the transfer function impulse lag coe￿ -
cients creates several problems in the multi-input model
that do not arise in the single-input case. First, the number
of lags to estimate must be chosen judiciously to avoid
depleting degrees of freedom. For instance, in our case with
eight inputs and 12 lags of each variable, the number of
parameters to estimate would exceed the sample size. Sec-
ond, we expect at least some degree of multicollinearity due
to autocorrelation and cross correlation among the xj vari-
ables. This multicollinearity will reduce the precision of
parameter estimates and may lead us to exclude variables
because they incorrectly appear to be statistically insigni® -
cant. Finally, as in the case of the single-input transfer
function model, the residuals, h t, will generally be serially
correlated, resulting in biased standard errors and ine￿ cient
estimates from OLS regressions.
We address each of these problems by following a proced-
ure suggested in Edlund (1984).
1 8 Initial lag lengths for the
input variables are set fairly conservatively, and insigni® cant
lags are eliminated. We begin with a maximum of eight lags
for CAEMP, JPY , EXCH, USY and the wealth variables
(USW andJPW ),and a maximum lagof sixmonths for hotel
wages (HWAGE). Six lags each of US and Japanese interest
rates (USR and JPR) are included, but with a 12-month pure
delay re¯ ecting our expectation that monetary in¯ uences
act with a considerable lag. The actual lag lengths used in
identifying the orders for the six AR and MA polynomials
are chosen empirically through a series of tests of the predic-
tive power of the estimated lag coe￿ cients. We use biased
regression (ridge) techniques to reduce the e￿ ect of multicol-
linearity on the variance of our estimated lag coe￿ cients.
We test for serially correlated residuals, h t, and correct for
any serial correlation before conducting inference.
1 9
Using this general-to-speci® c testing procedure, we were
able to reduce the parameterization of the system to the
® nal model reported in Table 3.
2 0 This model constitutes
our pre-intervention model of hotel room revenues. The
model contains ® ve inputs (growth rates of Californian
employment, real Japanese disposable income, real US and
Japanese stock price series, and the real US seven-year
government bond rate), as well as the two error-correction
terms. Although the change in the real yen/dollar exchange
rate does not show up as a separate input (it did not have
any explanatory power), it does enter the model in levels via
the error-correction terms.
The adequacy of the pre-intervention model is crucial,
since it serves as a reference point for evaluating the e￿ ects
of room taxeson revenues. The model ® ts the data very well;
76% of the variation in the growth of real room revenues is
captured by the inputs plus noise. The LjungÐ Box Q-statis-
tic, for the null hypothesis that the ® rst 25 residual auto-
correlations are jointly equal to zero, has a marginal
signi® cance level of over 33%. Thus, the unexplained move-
ments in real hotel revenue growth are not systematic. Fig. 1
illustrates both the in- and out-of-sample performance
of the pre-intervention model.
2 1 The post-intervention
Hawaii hotel room tax 1287Table 3. Transferfunctionparameterestimatesfor the pre-interven-
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z1 , t± 1 a 1 0.0699 0.0000
z2 , t± 1 a 2 - 0.2024 0.0000
CAEMPt w1 , 1 - 7.3992 0.0921
w1 , 2 - 6.6624 0.2918
w1 , 3 9.9593 0.0189
JPY t w2 , 1 - 0.0533 0.4065
w2 , 2 - 0.3945 0.0000
USW t w3 , 1 - 0.0006 0.0610
JPW t w4 , 3 0.0009 0.0089
w4 , 4 0.0004 0.1780
w4 , 5 0.0005 0.1940
USRt w5 , 1 5 - 0.0076 0.1823
w5 , 1 6 - 0.0012 0.8328
w5 , 1 7 - 0.0158 0.0088
at u 2 0.3991 0.0004
/ 3 - 0.9331 0.0000
/ 9 0.3275 0.0001
R ` 2 0.7583
MSLQ(25) 0.3387
Note: R ` 2 is the correlation coe￿ cient adjusted for degrees of
freedom, MSLQ(25) is the marginalsigni® cance of the LjungÐ Box
Q-statistic for the test of the null hypothesis that the ® rst 25
autocorrelations are jointly equal to zero. All variables are as
de® ned in the text and are in di￿erencedlogarithms,exceptfor the
two equilibrium error terms, z1 , t± 1 and z2 , t± 1.
2 2 Inspectionof the datasuggeststhat the short-runrelationshipsmaybethe result of an inverseseasonalrelationshipamongseries.While
we have ® ltered out non-stationaryseasonality (seasonal unit roots), stationary seasonal e￿ects remain and are modelled by the transfer
functions and the error model.
2 3 In the identi® ed model, only the noise term enters as a ratio of MA and AR polynomials, so that in e￿ ect we have identi® ed what is
known as an ARMAX model Ð an ARMA model with addedexplanatoryvariables.This speci® cationresulted from the empiricaltests on
our initial transfer function speci® cation, and the requirement that the individual transfer functions meet stability conditions. (See Box,
Jenkins and Reinsel, 1994, p. 376.)
.
forecasts have a root mean squared error of 0.246 and
clearly track the growth rates quite closely. On the basis of
these results, we would not expect the imposition of a hotel
room tax in 1987:1 to have signi® cantly a￿ected the growth
of real hotel room revenues in Hawaii.
Interpretation of the transfer functions for individual in-
puts is complicated by the fact that some of the observed
dynamic behaviour is due to stationary seasonality, and
because economic theory has little to say about short-run
dynamics. In some cases the signs of these terms can be
given meaningful economic interpretation; in others the
direction of e￿ ects seems counter-intuitive. For instance, the
transfer function for Japaneserealwealth implies a small net
rise in room revenues when Japanese wealth increases (the
impulse response is given by 0.0009 + 0.0004B + 0.0005B
2,
with a three-period pure delay). On the other hand, the
transfer function for real growth in Japanese disposable
income, - 0.053B - 0.395B
2, implies a counter-intuitive
negative relationship, as does the transfer function for
Californian employment ( - 7.40B - 6.7B
2 + 9.96B
3). In
the latter case only the positive impulse response weight at
lag three is signi® cantly di￿ erent from zero at the 5%
level.
2 2 , 2 3
The transfer function terms re¯ ect only the short-run
in¯ uences on room revenues of the input variables around
the long-run equilibrium path described by the cointegrat-
ing relationships de® ned by z1 , t± 1 and z2 , t± 1. The ® rst
equilibrium error has a counter-intuitive positive coe￿ cient
of a 1 = 0.07, while the second term has a coe￿ cient of
a 2 = - 0.20. These loading coe￿ cients measure the speed
of adjustment of real room revenues to a disequilibrium
error. For example, the second loading coe￿ cient by itself
suggests that short-run changes in room revenues, perhaps
due to a temporary fall in Japanese income, would push
room revenues back toward their long-run path, with 20%
of the equilibrium gap eliminated in the ® rst month. In this
way, deviations of real hotel room revenues from their
long-run expected values alter the growth rate of revenues
until equilibrium is restored several months later.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE HOTEL ROOM
TAX Ð AN INTERVENTION ANALYSIS
Considering the ® t of the out-of-sample forecast shown in
Fig. 1, we expect the pre-intervention model to hold up well
when estimated over the full sample. This expectation is
con® rmed by the full-sample estimation results shown in
Table 4. All of the full-sample parameter estimates are
within one and a half standard errors (most are within one
standard error) of those reported in Table 3 for the pre-
intervention sample. The moving averagecoe￿ cients on the
growth in Californian employment (lag two) and the change
in the US real government bond rate (lag 16) reverse
signs; however neither of these parameters is (individually)
signi® cantly di￿ erent from zero in either sample. The model
1288 C. S. Bonham and B. GangnesFig. 1. Pre- and post-intervention forecasts of growth in real hotel room revenues (Ð Ð actual; ------ forecast)
2 4 Sinceanysystematice￿ectof theinterventionwouldbeoverwhelmedbythestochasticpropertiesof thefullsetof residuals,we examined
the correllogram and LjungÐ Box Q-statistics using only the residuals in the period immediately following the intervention, 1987:1 to
1988:12.
2 5 The residualsfrom a full-sampleestimationof Equation15 are shown for the post-interventionsample from 1987:1to 1990:1,while the
pre-interventionresiduals are plotted for the period from 1978:9 to 1986:12.
.
® ts the full-sample period almost as well as the pre-inter-
vention period, and the residuals are found to be serially
uncorrelated.
2 4 Additional evidence of the adequacy of the
selected model is presented in Fig. 2, which shows the resid-
ual errors from pre-intervention and full-sample estimation
of Equation 15.
2 5 A signi® cant tax impact should show up
as a change in the residual pattern with persistent negative
residuals immediately following the tax change. These nega-
tive errors should graduallybe eliminated if the tax does not
permanently lower the growth of hotel revenues. Again,
there appears to be no systematic behaviour left unex-
plained by the pre-intervention model.
While the out-of-sample ® t and visual evidence presented
so far is compelling, we proceed to estimate an intervention
model over the full sample in an attempt to model any
impact on hotel revenues of the tax imposition. As discussed
by Box and Tiao (1975)and Harvey (1989),it is necessary to
postulate both the form the intervention dummy should
take and the shape of its transfer function. Because the room
tax represents a permanent increase in hotel costs, we anti-
cipate that it would most plausibly cause a one-time drop in
the level of hotel room revenues, without changing their
trend rate of growth. The growth rate time series should
then experience a (series of) temporary decline(s) but then
return to the path given by the pre-intervention model. This
hypothesized transient e￿ ect on growth rates calls for use of
a `pulse’ dummy variable that takes the value one when the
tax is adopted (1987:1) and is zero in all other time periods.
Following this event, there may be a delay before higher
prices reduce the demand for rooms or hoteliers begin to
absorb part of the room tax as lower revenues. After the
impact e￿ ect, we anticipate a gradualreturn to trend growth
rates over a number of months. We therefore add an inter-
vention term,
w9 (B)
1 - d 9 B
TDt± bT D, to Equation 15. The numer-
ator of this transfer function captures the (possibly lagged)
Hawaii hotel room tax 1289Table 4. Transfer function parameter estimates for the full sample,
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z1 , t± 1 a 1 0.0726 0.0000
z2 , t± 1 a 2 - 0.2101 0.0000
CAEMPt w1 , 1 - 11.8460 0.0045
w1 , 2 1.3251 0.8184
w1 , 3 6.9321 0.0845
JPY t w2 , 1 - 0.1100 0.0614
w2 , 2 - 0.3616 0.0000
USW t w3 , 1 - 0.0008 0.0058
JPW t w4 , 3 0.0007 0.0138
w4 , 4 0.0003 0.3539
w4 , 5 0.0008 0.0119
USRt w5 , 1 5 - 0.0049 0.3478
w5 , 1 6 0.0025 0.6284
w5 , 1 7 - 0.0123 0.0211
at u 2 0.3418 0.0002
/ 3 - 0.8537 0.0000
/ 9 0.2139 0.0056
R ` 2 0.7307
MSLQ(25) 0.3237
Note: See note to Table 3.
2 6 Coe￿ cients on the other transfer function terms in Equation 159 (see Table 4) are not signi® cantly di￿ erent from the results in Table 4,
and are omitted for brevity. In Model 2, the coe￿ cient on Californian employment (lag 2) does become negative again ( - 2.221 as
compared to - 6.662 in the pre-interventionsample) although it is still insigni® cantly di￿erent from zero.
2 7 Models were estimatedwith a pure delay rangingfrom zero to two monthsand with both pulse and step dummy variables.Alternative
modelsyieldeddi￿ering patternsof coe￿ cientestimates(switchingsign accordingto the lengthof pure delay,for example),yet our overall
conclusionsare una￿ected by the choice of a speci® c model.Each of the modelsusinga pulse dummyindicatesa permanent(insigni® cant)
growth rate e￿ ect, while each of the models using a step dummy indicates o￿setting e￿ ects across two months.
2 8 We also tested for misspeci® cation of our intervention model using a Chow-type test based on recursive residuals for the period
immediatelyfollowing theroomtax imposition,as suggestedin Harvey(1989).Recursiveresidualtests were performedfor the12-,16-, and
24-month periods following the tax imposition, and also for a full-sample estimation of the pre-interventionmodel with no intervention
e￿ ect. In no case did the tests indicate a misspeci® cation of the intervention.
impact e￿ ect of the tax increase, and the parameters of w9 (B)
are expected to be negative. The denominator term d 9 will lie
between zero and one if the pulse e￿ ect on the growth rate
dies out over time, as hypothesized.
Results from estimation of the intervention model are
given in Table 5.
2 6 Two models are shown, one with a pulse
dummy intervention term as described above, another using
a step dummy variable,corresponding to a permanent e￿ ect
on the revenue growth rate. Neither model shows a statist-
ically signi® cant overall impact from the room tax. Model
1 gives an impact e￿ ect of 0.2197 one month after the tax
change, followed by an o￿ setting decline of 0.2462 in the
following month. The total e￿ ect (sum of the two lag coe￿ -
cients) is insigni® cantly di￿ erent from zero at a marginal
signi® cance level of 0.964. Surprisingly, the estimated
autoregressive polynomial has a root which is insigni® -
cantly di￿erent from unity indicating that any (signi® cant) tax
e￿ect would cause a permanent change in the growth of hotel
revenues. Therefore, we concentrate on the alternative Model
2 results, where a step dummy is used. Here, the impact e￿ ect
is estimated to be - 0.3753 two months after the tax change,
followed by an o￿ setting increase of 0.3738 one month later.
Again, the total e￿ ect is insigni® cantly di￿ erent from zero at
a marginal signi® cance level of 99%.
2 7 Neither of the models
presented in Table 5 su￿ ers from serially correlated errors
either over the full sample or over the two-year period im-
mediately following the imposition of the room tax.
28
Post-intervention model performance, characteristics of
the residuals, and the estimated coe￿ cients on intervention
dummy variables all support the same conclusion: there was
no statistically signi® cant impact on hotel room revenues of
the room tax. Con® dence intervals on our estimates would
permit large negative impacts or even small positive e￿ ects,
but provide no clear evidence that the tax had the substan-
tial negative impact that hoteliers feared.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Taxes on hotel rooms have become a popular tax instru-
ment for many states and localities. They are seen as a ready
and politically palatable source of revenue by proponents,
but as a signi® cant tax burden by the hotel industry. In this
paper, we use intervention analysis to evaluate the impact
on hotel room revenues of a room levy imposed by the state
of Hawaiiin 1987.We ® nd no statistically signi® cant impact
of the room tax on room revenues.
We analyse the ex post e￿ ect of the room tax on revenues
within a time series econometric framework. We ® rst model
the empiricalbehaviour of hotel room revenues using a vari-
ant of the multi-input transfer function methodology de-
veloped by Box and Jenkins (Box, Jenkins and Reinsel,
1994). Our approach extends the basic transfer function
model to include long-run cointegrating relationships be-
tween room revenues and key explanatory variables. After
a suitable pre-intervention model is identi® ed, it is applied
1290 C. S. Bonham and B. GangnesFig. 2. Pre-intervention and full-sample residual error
Table 5. E¤ ect of the hotel room tax: parameter estimates for intervention dummy variables






D xj, t± bj +
w9 (B)
1 - d 9 B




Model 1 (pulse dummy) Model 2 (step dummy)
Marginal Marginal
signi® cance signi® cance
Intervention parameter Estimate level Estimate level
TDt± bT D w9 0 0.2197 0.0460 - 0.3753 0.0001
w9 1 - 0.2462 0.1260 0.3738 0.0001
d 9 1 1.1179 0.0262 Ð Ð
bTD 1 2
R ` 2 0.7333 0.7509
Q(34) 0.4726 0.3233
Q(6) 0.4647 0.8376
H0: w9 0 + w9 1 = 0 ( ~ x
2(1)) 0.9642 0.9882
Notes:Seenotesfor Table3.Parameterson othertransferfunctionsin Equation159 arenot substantially
di￿ erent from thosein Table 4 and are omitted here; detailsare availablefrom the authorsuponrequest.
Q(34) is a LjungÐ Box (1978) test for serially correlated residuals using the full sample. Q(6) tests are for
serially correlated errors using the ® rst six autocorrelations for the two-year period immediately
following the tax imposition.
Hawaii hotel room tax 1291to the post-intervention sample. The model ® ts the post-
intervention period very well, and examination of the post-
intervention residuals reveals no systematic error that could
be attributed to the tax imposition. The sum of coe￿ cients
on tax dummy variables is insigni® cantly di￿ erent from
zero. Our model appears to provide strong evidence against
any signi® cant permanent e￿ ect of the room tax on either
the level or growth rate of after-tax hotel room revenues.
Our ® nding of insigni® cant room tax e￿ ects may not be
too surprising. As pointed out by Bonham et al.(1992),a 5%
increase in room rates represents less than 1.5% of the total
cost of a typical Hawaiian vacation, so that large adjust-
ments to room demand are unlikely. Since the tax is added
to room bills on checkout, it may not be visibleto the tourist
when planning a vacation. And Hawaii was not alone in
implementing or increasing room taxes during this time
period. To the extent that taxes were rising in competing
markets, the adverse e￿ ect of Hawaii’s tax on competitive-
ness would be reduced. Finally, we should note that our
failure to ® nd a reduction in net room revenues does not
preclude adverse e￿ ects on other segments of the tourism
industry. If guests substitute higher room expenditures for
meals or gifts, the total impact of the tax may not be as
benign as our results suggest.
The time series revenue model developed here is a useful
tool for evaluating policy changes. Its apparent robustness
over our decade-long sample suggests it may also be useful
for forecasting and for scenario analysis. In the case of
Hawaii, the model might be used to study the recent sharp
downturn in Hawaiian tourism and to forecast recovery.
Similar models could be developed for studying the impacts
of other policy changes and programmes, for example to
evaluate the impact of tourism marketing programmes or
the e￿ ect on the visitor industry of sharp changes in ex-
change rate regimes.
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES AND
DEFINITIONS
All series are non-seasonally adjusted monthly data unless
otherwise indicated. Except for interest rates, natural logar-
ithms of all series are used in the analysis.
HR: Real Hawaii hotel room revenues. Computed from
nominal room tax base data, provided by the Department of
Business Economic Development and Tourism (DBEDT).
De¯ ated by the US consumer price index for all urban
consumers (CPI-U), as reported in the US Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Detail Report,
various issues. Room revenue data are computed as
HR = TAXBASE(t + 1) /USCPI(t) *1.0416, to adjust for
lagged reporting and to back in the 4% general excise tax.
JPY : Japanese real disposable income. Computed from
nominal disposable income in yen, de¯ ated by the Japanese
consumer price index. Both series are taken from the Japan
Statistical Association, Monthly Statistics of Japan, various
issues.
USY : US real personal disposable income. Computed from
nominal personal disposable income (seasonally adjusted),
reported in the Survey of Current Business, various issues.
De¯ ated by the US consumer price index.
CAEMP: Californiannon-farm employment, obtained from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics Economic Bulletin Board.
JPW : Real Japanese stock price. Tokyo stock price index in
nominal terms, de¯ ated by the Japanese consumer price
index. The former is taken from Monthly Statistics of Japan;
the latter is taken from MonthlyStatistics of Japanand from
Sorifu Tokeikyoku, Monthly Report of Retail Prices.
USW : Real US stock price. S&P 500 common stock com-
posite index, reported in the Survey of Current Business.
Obtained in machine-readable form from the Citibank Eco-
nomic Database Citibase. De¯ ated by the US consumer
price index.
EXCH: Real yen/dollar exchange rate. Nominal yen/dollar
exchange rate on a monthly average basis (series rf) is taken
from International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics, various issues. Real exchange rate is computed by
multiplying the nominal rate by the ratio of the US and
Japanese consumer price indexes.
JPR: Real Japanese government bond rate. Interest rate on
Japanese seven-year government bonds, reported in Inter-
national Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
various issues, minus the actual CPI in¯ ation rate.
USR: Real US government bond rate. Interest rate on US
seven-year government bonds, reported in Federal Reserve
Bulletin, various issues, minus the actual CPI in¯ ation rate.
HWAGE: Real Hawaii hotel industry wages. Average nom-
inal wage rate in Hawaii hotels (Bureau of Labor Statistics
data, obtained from DBEDT), de¯ ated by the US consumer
price index.
.
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